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ABSTRACT
Is it rational for selfish individuals to cooperate? The conventional answer based on analysis of games such as the Prisoners
Dilemma (PD) is that it is not, even though mutual cooperation results in a better outcome for all. This incompatibility between
individual rationality and collective benefit lies at the heart of questions about the evolution of cooperation, as illustrated by
PD and similar games. Here, we argue that this apparent incompatibility is due to an inconsistency in the standard Nash
framework for analyzing non-cooperative games and propose a new paradigm, that of the co-action equilibrium. As in the
Nash solution, agents know that others are just as rational as them and taking this into account leads them to realize that
others will independently adopt the same strategy, in contrast to the idea of unilateral deviation central to Nash equilibrium
thinking. Co-action equilibrium results in better collective outcomes for games representing social dilemmas, with relatively
“nicer” strategies being chosen by rational selfish individuals. In particular, the dilemma of PD gets resolved within this
framework, suggesting that cooperation can evolve in nature as the rational outcome even for selfish agents, without having
to take recourse to additional mechanisms for promoting it.
Introduction
Strategic interactions occur all around us in a multitude of forms between autonomous agents. These interacting agents
could correspond to individual humans or animals or even computer algorithms, as well as, collective entities such as groups,
organizations or nations. Analyzing their interactions in terms of games1 is a promising approach for understanding the
behavior of a wide variety of socio-economic and biological systems, and finds applications in fields ranging from economics
and political science to computer science and evolutionary biology.2 A game is described by the set of all possible actions by
a specified number of agents, where each possible combination of actions is associated with a payoff for each agent. Thus,
the payoff received by an agent depends on her choice of action, as well as that of others. Agents are assumed to be rational
and selfish, who want to maximize their individual payoffs. In addition, every agent knows that all agents satisfy these criteria
(for a detailed discussion of these ideas see, e.g., Ref.3). Each of these assumptions is crucial in determining the outcome of
a game. While they may or may not hold in specific real-life scenarios, the agent behavior embodied by these assumptions
provides a crucial benchmark for strategic behavior.
In order to solve a game, i.e., to find the set of actions that the agents will employ given the structure of the game, one
needs a solution concept that will form the basis for strategy selection by the agents. For non-cooperative games, where
agents choose their actions independently without communicating with other agents, the canonical solution concept employed
is that of the Nash equilibrium. It is defined informally as the set of actions chosen by the agents where no agent can
gain by unilaterally deviating from this equilibrium.4 Nash equilibria exist for all games having a finite number of agents
choosing from a finite set of actions, making it a very general concept that has wide applicability.5 Indeed, the concept has
been central to various attempts at developing quantitative descriptions of socio-economic phenomena.6 However, analyzing
specific games using the concept of Nash equilibrium can raise the following issues: (i) A game may have more than one
Nash equilibria and hence, deciding which of these will be adopted by rational agents is a non-trivial problem.7 Additional
criteria need to be provided for selecting an equilibrium; however their success is not always guaranteed.8 (ii) The Nash
equilibrium of a game may sometimes be inferior to an alternative choice of actions by the agents in which all the parties
get higher payoff. This gives rise to apparently paradoxical situations in games representative of social dilemmas, such as
the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD),9 the Traveler’s Dilemma,10,11 etc. For example, in PD, where each agent has the option to
either cooperate with the other agents or defect, mutual defection is the only Nash equilibrium, although mutual cooperation
will result in higher payoffs for all agents. Results of experimental realizations of such games also show deviation from the
Nash solutions.9,12 That rational action by individual agents can result in an undesirable collective outcome for the agents
is a long-standing puzzle.13 In particular, it raises questions about how cooperation could have evolved and is maintained in
natural populations.14
Here we argue that the genesis of this problem can be traced to a mutual inconsistency between the assumptions underlying
the Nash equilibrium for symmetric game situations. One of these assumptions is that each agent is equally capable of
analyzing the game situation and that all of them are aware of this. However, it is also assumed that agents can make
unilateral deviations in their strategy, which is used to obtain a dominant strategy in games like PD. In other words, each
agent looks only at the payoff structure of the game and takes a decision that is independent of how other agents decide. This
is inconsistent with the earlier assumption because if the agents are aware that the others are also rational, they should take
this (rational decision-making by the other agents) into account. To put it informally, the player will argue that “if the other
player is like me, then she will be independently choosing the same strategy (although not necessarily the same action if it is
a mixed strategy) as I, because we are faced with the same situation.” In this paper we present a novel solution paradigm for
payoff-symmetric games, referred to as co-action equilibrium, that resolves this inconsistency, building on a concept originally
introduced in the context of minority games.15 As we shall see, the optimal action of rational agents in co-action equilibrium
is markedly different from Nash equilibrium and leads to better collective outcomes, solving various social dilemmas such as
PD.
The mutual inconsistency between (i) the assumption of players being aware that all of them are rational and (ii) the
possibility of a dominant strategy, had been earlier pointed out informally in the specific context of PD - although, to the
best of our knowledge, there have been no attempts to develop a quantitative framework that addresses this problem. In
what is possibly the earliest statement about the rationality of cooperation in PD, Rapoport16 had argued that because of the
symmetry of the game, rational players will choose the same action - and as it involves a higher payoff, they will always
opt for mutual cooperation. This argument has been independently put forward by Hofstadter17 in the context of a N-person
PD. The response of conventional game theory to this line of reasoning, as set forth at length by Binmore,18 centers on the
argument that these approaches crucially rely on constraining the set of feasible outcomes of the game to the main diagonal
of the payoff matrix, thereby making it effectively a collective decision-making process.19 As outlined in detail below, the
co-action approach presented here allows the agents access to the full set of outcomes in the game matrix and the solution
is obtained without restricting their choices of action. It is also general, applying to all symmetric non-cooperative games.
As the theory of strategic interactions is central to the analysis of many phenomena across economics, social sciences and
evolutionary biology, the co-action concept could potentially lead to new insights across a broad range of disciplines.
In this paper we analyze single-stage games with two actions per agent, where the payoff structure is unchanged on
exchanging the identities of the agents (payoff symmetry). We primarily focus on two-person games, with agents playing
the game once (in contrast to repeated games where agents can interact many times in an iterative manner) and analyze in
detail three well-known instances, viz., PD, Chicken (also referred to as snow-drift or Hawk-Dove) and Stag Hunt. These
games model a wide variety of conflict situations in nature where cooperation may emerge under certain circumstances.20
We describe the co-action solution for these games which, in general, leads to “nicer” strategies being selected by the agents
compared to the Nash solution. For example, the co-action equilibrium in PD corresponds to full cooperation among agents
at lower values of temptation to defect, while for higher temptation each agent employs a probabilistic strategy. Thus, co-
action typically results in more globally efficient outcomes, reconciling the apparent conflict between individual rationality
and collective benefit. Further, the co-action equilibrium is unique and therefore, agents are not faced with the problem of
equilibrium selection. The concept can be extended to other scenarios, such as, symmetric games involving several players,
or even non-symmetric games when agents can be grouped into clusters with symmetry holding within each. In fact, the latter
case can be seen as defining a new class of games between players, where each “player” represents a group of agents who
independently choose the same strategy.
The Co-action equilibrium
To describe the co-action solution concept, we consider the general case of a payoff-symmetric, two-person game where
each agent (say, A and B) has two possible actions (Action 1 and Action 2) available to her. Each agent receives a payoff
corresponding to the pair of choices made by them. If both agents choose the same option, Action 1 (or 2), each receives the
payoff R (or P, respectively), while if they opt for different choices, the agent choosing Action 1 receives payoff S while the
other receives T . Thus, the game can be represented by a payoff matrix that specifies all possible outcomes (Fig. 1). An agent
may employ a mixed strategy, in which she randomly selects her options, choosing Action 1 with some probability p (say)
and Action 2 with probability (1− p). A pure strategy corresponds to p being either 0 or 1. A Nash equilibrium for a game
can be in pure strategies or in mixed strategies. As noted earlier, a given game may have more than one Nash equilibrium,
possibly involving mixed strategies. Assuming that agent A (B) chooses Action 1 with probability p1 (p2) and Action 2 with
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Figure 1. A generic representation of the payoff matrix for a two-person symmetric game where each agent has two actions
available to her. For each pair of actions, the first entry in each payoff pair belongs to Agent A while the second belongs to
Agent B. Different games discussed in the text, such as PD, Chicken and Stag-hunt, are defined in terms of different
hierarchical relations among the elements T , R, P and S.
probability 1− p1 (1− p2, respectively), their expected payoffs are,
WA = p1(p2(R+P−T − S)+ S−P)+ p2(T −P)+P,
WB = p2(p1(R+P−T − S)+ S−P)+ p1(T −P)+P. (1)
The symmetry of the game is reflected in the fact that WA and WB are interchanged on exchanging p1 with p2. It is easily seen
that if a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists, it is the same for both agents and given by the probabilities
p∗1 = p
∗
2 =
P− S
(R+P−T − S)
. (2)
The Nash solution assumes that all agents are rational and that each agent knows the planned equilibrium strategies of
the other agents. Furthermore, a unilateral deviation in strategy by one of them will not change the strategy choice of others
(who are assumed to be just as rational as the one who deviated!). This is implicit in Eq. 1 where each agent maximizes
her payoff independent of the strategy of the other agent. In other words, while making a choice the agents do not take into
account the fact that the other agents (who are assumed to have identical capabilities) are also deciding simultaneously on
their choice and that they are all aware of this. Although this latter assumption is deeply embedded in standard game theory,
it is inconsistent with the assumption that every agent is aware that all other agents are just as rational as them. By contrast, in
the co-action concept, by virtue of the symmetry of the game, each agent will argue that whatever complicated processes she
employs in arriving at the optimal decision, the other agents will choose the same strategy as they have the same information
and capabilities. It is important to note that this does not require any communication between the agents nor does it invoke the
existence of trust or other extraneous concepts. Rather, it arises from the fact that both agents are equally rational and being in
a symmetric situation, will reach the same conclusion about the choice of strategy; moreover, they realize and consider this in
making their decision. It is important to note that the co-action concept does not imply that both agents will necessarily end
up choosing the same action. For instance, the co-action solution for the single-stage PD is not to always cooperate - which
distinguishes the present approach from the earlier arguments of Rapoport16 and Hofstadter17 where all agents always choose
the same action - but to resort to a mixed strategy when the temptation to defect is sufficiently high.
In the co-action concept, each agent maximizes her payoff assuming that all other agents in a symmetric situation will
be making the same decision. Formally this amounts to optimizing the expected payoff functions of each of the two agents,
which in this case are identical:
WA,B =W = p2(R+P−T − S)+ p(T + S− 2P)+P. (3)
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Here p is the probability with which each of the agents A and B chooses Action 1. Under the co-action concept, the equilibrium
strategy p∗ of the agents is obtained by maximizing W with respect to p∈ [0,1]. If the maximum of function W in [0,1] occurs
at one of the ends (i.e., p = 0 or 1), it results in a pure strategy co-action equilibrium. However, if W has a maximum inside
(0,1) then the co-action equilibrium is a non-trivial mixed strategy, viz.,
p∗ =
2P− (T + S)
2(R+P−T − S)
. (4)
The existence of the co-action equilibrium for all symmetric games is guaranteed from the smoothness of polynomial functions
such as Eq. 3. Also, unlike the Nash equilibrium, the co-action equilibrium is unique and thus, for a given symmetric game
there is no ambiguity about the optimal choice of action for the agents.
Case studies
Having described the concept of co-action equilibrium, we will now apply it to three well-known two-person symmetric
games, illustrating in each case the differences between the co-action and Nash equilibria. Each of these games is defined in
terms of a specific hierarchical relationship between the payoffs R, S, T and P (using the terminology of the payoff matrix
shown in Fig. 1).
Prisoner’s Dilemma
PD is one of the most well-studied games in the literature of strategic choices in social sciences and evolutionary biology.21,22
It is the canonical paradigm for analyzing the problems associated with evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals.14
The game represents a strategic interaction between two agents who have to choose between cooperation (Action 1) and
defection (Action 2). If both players decide to cooperate, each receives a “reward” payoff R and if both players decide to
defect, then each receives a “punishment” payoff P. If one of the players decides to defect and the other to cooperate, then
the former gets a payoff T (often termed as the “temptation” to defect) and the latter gets the “sucker’s payoff” S.
In PD the hierarchical relation between the different payoffs is T > R > P > S. The only Nash equilibrium for this game is
both agents choose defection (each receiving payoff P), as unilateral deviation by an agent would yield a lower payoff (S) for
her. Note that, mutual defection is the only Nash solution even if the game is repeatedly played between the players a finite
number of times. However, it is easy to see that mutual cooperation would have resulted in a higher payoff (R) for both agents.
This illustrates the apparently paradoxical aspect of the Nash solution for PD where pursuit of self-interest by rational agents
leads to a less preferable outcome for all parties involved. The failure on the part of the agents - who have been referred to
as “rational fools”23 - to see the obviously better strategy is at the core of the dilemma and has important implications for the
social sciences, including economists’ assumptions about the efficiency of markets.24 Further, experimental realizations of
PD show that some degree of cooperation is achieved when the game is played by human subjects, which is at variance with
the Nash solution.9,12,25
In more general terms, PD raises questions about how cooperation can emerge in a society of rational individuals pursuing
their self-interest14 and there have been several proposals to address this issue. These have mostly been in the context of the
iterative PD (rather than the single-stage game that we are considering here) and typically involve going beyond the standard
structure of the game, e.g., by introducing behavioral rules such as direct or indirect reciprocity,26 assuming informational
asymmetry,27 etc. By contrast, in the co-action solution, rational selfish agents achieve non-zero levels of cooperation in the
standard single-stage PD, with the degree of cooperation depending on the ratio of temptation T to reward R.
To obtain the co-action solution of PD, we use the formalism described earlier with the value of the lowest payoff S
assumed to be zero without loss of generality. From Eq. 3 and using the hierarchical relation among the payoffs T , R and P for
PD, it follows that when T ≤ 2R, the optimal strategy for the agents is p∗ = 1, i.e., both agents always cooperate. On the other
hand, when the temptation to defect T > 2R, the optimal strategy is a mixed one with the probability of cooperation [Eq. 4],
p∗ =
T − 2P
2(T −R−P)
, (5)
i.e., the agents randomly choose between the available actions, defecting with probability 1− p∗. As temptation keeps increas-
ing, the probability of cooperation decreases and in the limit T → ∞, p∗→ 1/2, i.e., the agents choose to cooperate or defect
with equal probability, receiving an expected payoff W ∗→ T/4. Thus, unlike the Nash solution of PD where cooperation is
not possible, the co-action solution of the game always allows a non-zero level of cooperation, with 1/2 < p∗ < 1 [Fig. 2 (a)].
The co-action solution also differs from the result expected based on the reasoning given by Rapoport and Hofstadter16,17 -
essentially a collective rationality argument - which suggests that rational agents will always cooperate. To the best of our
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Figure 2. The variation of the optimal strategy - probability of choosing Action 1, p∗ - under the co-action solution concept
for the games (a) Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and (b) Chicken, as a function of the payoff matrix elements T , P, R and S. In
both games, for low values of T (corresponding to temptation for defection in PD and for being aggressive in Chicken), the
agents always opt for Action 1 (corresponding to cooperation in PD and being docile in Chicken). However, as T increases,
agents opt for a mixed strategy, where Action 1 is chosen with decreasing probability. In both cases, in the limit of very high
T , the agent strategy becomes fully random with the two actions being chosen with equal probability. Note that in PD, the
optimal strategy also has a very weak dependence on P (corresponding to punishment payoff for mutual defection).
knowledge, co-action is the first solution concept which allows probabilistic cooperation by the players in the single-stage PD.
The existence of non-zero level of cooperation in the co-action solution means that there is no longer any incompatibility
between the individual actions of rational agents trying to maximize their payoffs and achieving the best possible collective
outcome, thereby resolving the “dilemma” in PD. The co-action concept may be used to solve other games involving similar
dilemmas such as traveler’s dilemma.10 It is of interest to note in this context that in the various experimental realizations of
PD, the level of cooperation observed is neither zero (as in the Nash solution) nor complete - the average being about 50% but
with significant variation across experiments.25 While it is unclear if such realistic game conditions conform to the idealized
assumption of rational agents, the co-action solution does provide a benchmark strategy for these situations.
Chicken
Chicken (also referred to as Snowdrift or Hawk-Dove) is a two-person game that has been extensively investigated in the
context of the study of social interactions and evolutionary biology.21,28 It represents a strategic interaction between two
agents who have to choose between being docile (Action 1) or being aggressive (Action 2). If both agents decide to be docile,
they receive the payoff R, while if one is docile when the other resorts to aggression, the former - considered the “loser” -
receives a lower payoff S (< R) and the latter - the “winner” - receives a higher payoff T (> R). However, the worst possible
outcome corresponds to when both players choose to be aggressive, presumably resulting in severe damage to both, which is
associated with the lowest payoff P. Thus, the hierarchical relation between the different payoffs in Chicken is T > R > S > P.
Note that it differs from PD in that the payoff S is higher than P. Therefore, an agent benefits by being aggressive only if the
other is docile but is better off being docile otherwise, as the cost of mutual aggression is high.
The game has three Nash equilibria, of which two correspond to pure strategies where one agent is docile while the other
is aggressive. The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium p∗1 = p∗2 = S/(T + S−R) is given by Eq. (2), where it is assumed that
the lowest of the possible payoffs P is zero [see Fig. 2 (b)]. As in many other non-cooperative games with multiple Nash
equilibria, one has to invoke additional criteria (viz., equilibrium refinements7) to decide which of these solutions will be
selected by the agents. In Chicken, a commonly used refinement concept is that of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)28 -
an important concept in evolutionary game theory29 - which, in this game, gives the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium as the
unique solution.
To obtain the co-action solution for Chicken, we note that under this solution concept, agents choose their actions so as to
optimize the payoff function Eq. (3). Using the hierarchical relation of the payoffs for Chicken (assuming the lowest payoff P
is zero without loss of generality), it is easy to see that for 2R≥ T +S, p∗ = 1 is the optimal choice. On the other hand, when
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2R < T + S, agents choose to be docile with a probability [Eq. (4)],
p∗ =
T + S
2(T + S−R)
. (6)
Thus, for low values of T , both agents decide to be docile (non-aggressive) always and avoid damaging each other, whereas,
when the stakes are high (for large T ) they randomly choose between the available actions, being docile with probability p∗
and aggressive with probability 1− p∗. As in PD, in the limit of large T , i.e., T → ∞, the optimal strategy is p∗→ 1/2, where
the agents choose to be aggressive or docile with equal probability, receiving an expected payoff W ∗→ T/4.
It is instructive to compare the optimal strategy of the agents under the different solution concepts when the stakes are
very high. In the limit of T → ∞, the ESS suggests that both agents should resort to mutual aggression [i.e., p∗1 = p∗2 → 0
which is evident from Eq. (2)]. This would result in both agents suffering serious damage and receiving the lowest possible
payoff P. Compared to this, the co-action concept yields a a significantly better outcome for both agents, as noted above. This
difference is remarkable as the co-action solution shows that “nice” behavior among rational agents can occur even in a highly
competitive environment. As in PD, experimental realizations of the single-stage game have reported a significant level (about
50%) of cooperative behavior.30
Stag Hunt
The last of the two-person games we discuss here is the Stag Hunt which is used to describe many social situations where
cooperation is required to achieve the best possible outcome.31 The game represents a strategic interaction between two
agents who have to choose between a high-risk strategy having potentially large reward, viz., hunting for stag (Action 1) or
a relatively low-risk, but poor-yield, strategy, viz., hunting for hare (Action 2). The agents can catch a stag (which is worth
more than a hare) only if they both opt for it, i.e., cooperate, thereby receiving the highest payoff R. However, being unsure of
what the other will do, they may both choose the safer option of hunting hare, which can be done alone, so that each receives a
lower payoff P. However, if one agent chooses to hunt stag while the other decides to hunt hare, the former being unsuccessful
in the hunt receives the lowest possible payoff S, while the latter (who succeeds in catching hare) gets the payoff T . Thus, the
hierarchical relation between the payoffs in Stag Hunt is R > T ≥ P > S.
As in Chicken, the game has three Nash equilibria, of which two correspond to pure strategies where both agents opt for
hunting stag or both choose to hunt hare. Note that both strategies are also evolutionarily stable, so that the ESS refinement,
unlike in Chicken, does not yield a unique solution for this game. The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium p∗1 = p∗2 = P/(P+
R−T) is given by Eq. (2) where it is assumed that the lowest of the possible payoffs S is zero.
The co-action solution for Stag Hunt is obtained by noting that as R is greater than T , the payoff function [Eq. (3)] increases
monotonically in the interval [0,1]. Thus, the co-action payoff W = p2(R+P−T )+ p(T −2P)+P is optimized when p∗ = 1,
regardless of the values of R, T and P. Therefore, the solution of the game under the co-action concept is unique, with both
agents opting to hunt stag, resulting in the best outcome for them. It may be of interest to note that experiments in single-stage
Stag Hunt have reported that players tend to choose to coordinate on the higher payoff outcome in the majority of cases.31–33
Unlike in the previous two case-studies, there is no conflict of interest among the agents playing Stag Hunt, who are instead
trying to coordinate their actions in the absence of any communication. Thus, it can be viewed as a problem of equilibrium
selection, with the co-action solution corresponding to the better one.
Discussion
In this paper we have shown that the conflict between pursuit of individual self-interest and occurrence of collective outcomes
that are mutually beneficial in the context of social dilemmas such as PD may only be an apparent one. The co-action
concept presented here resolves this conflict by making mutually consistent assumptions about the behavior of rational agents.
The different games that are analyzed in detail here show that the co-action solution concept leads to strategies that are
relatively “nicer” and globally more efficient compared to the standard Nash equilibrium concept. In particular, it resolves
the dilemma in PD as the mutually beneficial action, viz., cooperation, always has a significant probability (≥ 1/2) of being
chosen by both agents. Similarly, co-action yields more cooperative outcomes in the other games, i.e., agents playing Chicken
resort to non-aggressive strategies and agents achieve perfect coordination to receive the highest possible payoff in Stag Hunt.
Thus, this solution concept reconciles the idea of individual self-interest pursued by rational agents with the achievement of
collective outcomes that are mutually beneficial, even for single-stage games. While we do not claim that co-action is the only
mechanism by which cooperation may originate and be maintained in nature, it certainly shows that cooperation can evolve
among selfish rational agents. Note that our results do not depend on the specific definition of rationality one uses, as long as
the same definition applies to all agents.
For an N-player (N > 2) game, if it can be considered as the set of all pair-wise interactions between agents who are
symmetric in every respect, it is easy to see that the optimal co-action strategy will be exactly the same as that of the two-
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person game. The co-action solution concept can be generalized even to cases where the symmetry assumption does not hold
across all agents. If the agents are aware that some of the other agents are different from them, one can still apply co-action
within each cluster of agents (group) whose members consider each other to be identical (i.e., the symmetry assumption
holds). For agents belonging to different groups, however, the payoffs are not invariant under interchanging the identities
of the players. Thus, the symmetry of agents is broken across groups. For a population of agents whose members can be
considered as belonging to two groups, one can treat the game as a two-player Nash-like scenario where each “player” is
now a group of agents. However, unlike the standard Nash setting where one cannot have a mixed strategy as a stable Nash
equilibrium, it is now possible for mixed strategy equilibria to be stable.34 In general, one can consider a game with N agents,
clustered into M symmetry groups, who have to choose between two actions. Assuming that the size of each group i is ni
(Σini = N), the payoff for an agent belonging to the i-th group is a polynomial of degree ni in pi (i = 1, . . . ,M), where each pi
is the probability of agents in that group to choose one of the actions. By contrast, the corresponding formulation of the game
in terms of Nash solution concept will involve N variables with the payoffs being linear in each of these variables. Therefore,
this defines a novel class of games between multiple clusters of agents, with agents independently choosing the same strategy
as the other members of the cluster they belong to. The co-action results for such games may have potential implications for
multi-agent strategic interactions, as in the tragedy of commons.35
While the results discussed here are in the context of idealized situations involving rational selfish agents, one may ask
under what conditions would the co-action framework apply in real life. As we have outlined above, symmetry is a crucial
ingredient for co-action thinking to apply. Such symmetry is more likely to be realized among members of a given community
who share the same beliefs and a common identity. It has indeed been observed that cooperation is more common within
an in-group than between agents belonging to different groups.36 The significant levels of cooperative behavior reported in
experimental realizations of social dilemmas (e.g., see Refs.9,25 for PD and Ref.37 for its N-person generalization, i.e., the
public goods game, Ref.30 for Chicken and Refs.31–33 for stag-hunt) could, to some extent, be explained by players ascribing
to other players the same reasoning process as themselves and therefore resorting to co-action-like thinking. Experiments
with human subjects playing PD have shown that the level of cooperation depends on the actual values of payoffs and in
general decreases with the ratio of temptation for defection to reward for cooperation25 - in line with the co-action solution.
Also, players are known to employ non-deterministic strategies in PD realizations,38 similar to what agents do in the co-action
equilibrium for sufficiently high temptation. Game situations that allow “cheap talk” (i.e., communication between agents that
does not directly affect payoff)39 which presumably allow players to affirm shared set of values - and thereby promote co-action
thinking - have been shown to increase the level of cooperation in experiments.40 In other experimental realizations, where
players in a public goods game indicated their preferred contributions for different average levels of contribution by other
group members, about half the players were observed to match what the others would do.41 Such “conditional cooperation”
could be an illustration of the symmetry considerations that players might engage in. Also, the co-action framework could
provide a natural setting for the emergence of tag-based cooperation schemes among “sufficiently similar” agents.42 The idea
of “social projection”43 provides yet another instance where such considerations may be relevant. We note that there have
been other approaches towards explaining cooperation in social dilemmas based on symmetry of the game situation, e.g., a
recent model in which agents decide their strategies based on their most optimistic forecast about how the game would be
played if they formed coalitions.44
In this paper we have focused on single-stage games but the co-action concept discussed here applies also to repeated
games where information about the choices made by agents in the past are used to decide their future action. In this situation,
the co-action solution developed in the context of single-stage games is applied at each iteration, with the past actions of
agents used to define the different symmetry groups.15 This is inherently a dynamical process, as the membership of these
groups can evolve in time. For example, in iterative PD with N agents having memory of the choices made in the previous
iteration, all agents who made the same decision in the last round will belong to the same symmetry group and will behave
identically. The resulting solution can allow coexistence of cooperators and defectors in the game, which we will discuss in a
future publication.
To conclude, we have introduced here a solution framework for non-cooperative games that resolves the apparent conflict
between rationality of individual agents and globally efficient outcomes. It suggests that cooperation can evolve in nature as
the rational outcome even with selfish agents, without having to take recourse to additional mechanisms for promoting it. In
practice, the co-action and Nash solutions could represent two extreme benchmark strategies for non-cooperative games, the
latter applying when the agents cannot be considered to be “sufficiently similar”. While we do not address here the question
of which concept is more appropriate for a given situation, it is conceivable that agent behavior in reality may be described
by a strategy between these two extremes and can potentially be represented by a combination of them. Although we have
discussed co-action in the context of the evolution of cooperation among rational agents, the concept is far more general
and could provide a mechanism for understanding strategic interactions across groups of sufficiently similar agents in many
different settings.
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